Pairwise comparisons between alternatives are a well-established tool to decompose decision problems into smaller and more easily tractable sub-problems. However, due to our limited rationality, the subjective preferences expressed by decision makers over pairs of alternatives can hardly ever be consistent. Therefore, several inconsistency indices have been proposed in the literature to quantify the extent of the deviation from complete consistency. Only recently, a set of axioms has been proposed to define a family of functions representing inconsistency indices. The scope of this paper is to expand the axiomatic framework by adding and justifying a new axiom.
Introduction
In decision making problems it is often common practice to use pairwise comparisons between alternatives as a basis to derive a more reliable rating of the same alternatives. Pairwise comparisons allow the decision maker to decompose the problem of assigning scores to alternatives into smaller problems, where only two alternatives are considered at a time. One of the foremost mathematical methods utilizing this technique is the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) by Saaty (2013) .
Another reason for using pairwise comparisons is that their use allows an estimation of the consistency of the preferences of a decision maker. In the literature, consistency of preferences is commonly related with the rationality of a decision maker and his ability in discriminating between alternatives (Irwin, 1958) . Considering three alternatives x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , if, for instance, x 1 is reputed 2 times better than x 2 , and x 2 2 times better than x 3 , then it is reasonable to assume that x 1 should be 4 times better than x 3 . This situation is called consistent, as the preferences of the decision maker respect a principle of transitivity/rationality, and is depicted in Figure 1(a) . An example of inconsistent preferences is illustrated in Figure 1(b) . There is a meeting of minds on accepting preferences which are not consistent, but not
(a) Consistent preferences. too inconsistent either. In this paper, with the term inconsistency we mean a deviation from the condition of full consistency. In the theory of the AHP, Saaty (1993) required pairwise comparisons to be near consistent, i.e. not too inconsistent. As recalled by Gass (2005) , Luce and Raiffa (1957) shared the same opinion in accepting inconsistencies and wrote "No matter how intransitivities arise, we must recognize that they exist, and we can take a little comfort in the thought that they are an anathema to most of what constitutes theory in the behavioral sciences today". On a similar note, Fishburn (1999) wrote that "Transitivity is obviously a great practical convenience and a nice thing to have for mathematical purposes, but long ago this author ceased to understand why it should be a cornerstone of normative decision theory". Even Savage (1972) , in his fundamental contribution to decision theory, called consistency a desideratum. It is in this context-where consistency is an auspicable but hardly ever achievable condition-that it becomes crucial to quantify inconsistency. Such quantification is indeed possible, since it is natural to envision that the notion of inconsistency is a matter or degree. Consequently, a wealth of inconsistency indices has been proposed in the literature; for instance the Consistency Index (Saaty, 2013) , the Harmonic Consistency Index (Stein and Mizzi, 2007) , the Geometric Consistency Index (Aguarón and Moreno-Jiménez, 2003) , the statistical index by Lin et al. (2013) , and the index by Ku lakowski (2015), just to cite few.
Inconsistency of preferences has been studied empirically (Bozóki et al, 2013) , and existing studies on inconsistency indices compared them numerically (Brunelli et al, 2013a) and showed that some indices are very different and therefore can lead to very different evaluations of the inconsistency of preferences. Conversely, it was proven that some of them are in fact proportional to each other (Brunelli et al., 2013b) . Recently, Brunelli and Fedrizzi (2015a) and Koczkodaj and Szwarc (2014) proposed two axiomatic approaches. Brunelli and Fedrizzi (2015a) proposed five reasonable properties in the form of axioms to characterize the concept of inconsistency index and then tested on some well-known indices. The results showed that some indices do not fully satisfy the axioms and therefore they are suspected of ill-behavior.
In the pursuit of a more formal treatment of inconsistency quantification, in this research a new axiom, of invariance under inversion of preferences, is introduced and its necessity is justified.
Pairwise comparison matrices and inconsistency indices
Given a set X = {x 1 , . . . , x n } of n alternatives, a pairwise comparison matrix is a positive square matrix A = (a ij ) n×n such that a ij a ji = 1, where a ij > 0 is the subjective assessment of the relative importance of the ith alternative with respect to the jth one. For instance, a ij = 2 means that, for the decision maker, the ith alternative is two times better than the jth one. A pairwise comparison matrix can be seen as a convenient mathematical structure into which valued pairwise comparisons between alternatives are collected. Its general and its simplified (thanks to a ij a ji = 1) forms are the following,
Furthermore, a pairwise comparison matrix is consistent if and only if
which means that each direct comparison a ik is exactly backed up by all indirect comparisons a ij a jk ∀j. For notational convenience, the set of all pairwise comparison matrices is defined as
The set of all consistent pairwise comparison matrices A * ⊂ A is defined accordingly,
An inconsistency index is a function I : A → R which evaluates the intensity of deviation of a pairwise comparison matrix A from its consistent form (1). In other words, the value I(A) is an estimation of how much irrational the preferences collected in A are. Up to now, various inconsistency indices have been introduced heuristically, and an open question related to what set of axioms should be used to characterize them. That is, all the necessary properties for a function I to fairly capture inconsistency should form an axiomatic system, which could then be used for various purposes; for example to check the validity of already proposed indices (Brunelli and Fedrizzi, 2015a) , devise new ones,
Figure 2: The set of axioms characterizes a family of functions which can be used to estimate inconsistency, and discards functions which do not make sense if used as inconsistency indices, e.g. the trace and the determinant of A.
and derive further properties (Brunelli and Fedrizzi, 2015b) . Figure 2 offers a snapshot of the meaning of the axiomatic system. Presently, five axioms exist to characterize inconsistency indices (Brunelli and Fedrizzi, 2015a) . Since these axioms were already justified and defined in the original work, they are here only briefly recalled. Note that, in line with other axiomatic systems, the soundness of single axioms implies the soundness of the entire axiomatic system, i.e. the "logical intersection" of the axioms A1: There exists a unique ν ∈ R representing the situation of full consistency, i.e.
∃!ν ∈ R such that I(A) = ν ⇔ A ∈ A * .
A2: Changing the order of the alternatives does not affect the inconsistency of preferences. That is, I(PAP T ) = I(A),
for any permutation matrix P. . Then, the property is as follows,
A3: If preferences in
A4: Given a consistent pairwise comparison matrix and considering an arbitrary nondiagonal element a pq (and its reciprocal a qp ) such that a pq = 1, then, as we push its value far from its original one, the inconsistency of the matrix should not decrease. More formally, given a consistent matrix A ∈ A * , let A pq (δ) be the inconsistent matrix obtained from A by replacing the entry a pq with a δ pq , where δ = 1. Necessarily, a qp must be replaced by a δ qp in order to preserve reciprocity. Let A pq (δ ′ ) be the inconsistent matrix obtained from A by replacing entries a pq and a qp with a δ ′ pq and a δ ′ qp respectively. The property can then be formulated as
for all δ = 1, p, q = 1, . . . , n, and A ∈ A * .
A5: Function I is continuous with respect to the entries of A.
A new axiom of invariance under inversion of preferences
Preferences expressed in the form of a pairwise comparison matrix A can be inverted by taking its transpose A T . For instance, if a ij = 2 in A, this indicates that x i is twice as good as x j . Vice versa, the same element in A T states that x j is twice as good as x i . Clearly, by inverting all the preferences we change their polarity, but leave their structure unchanged. Thus, it is reasonable to expect a structural property of preferences-as inconsistency is-to be invariant under inversion. This can be formalized in the following axiom of invariance under inversion of preferences (A6).
Axiom 6. An inconsistency index satisfies A6, if and only if I(A)
Note that an inversion of preferences cannot be obtained by row-column permutations. The following simple example shown that, given an A ∈ A, there does not always exist a permutation matrix P such that PAP T = A T .
Example 1 It can be checked that there does not exist any permutation matrix P such that A T can be expressed as PAP T .
One natural question is whether or not this new axiom, A6, is implied by a conjoint application of the others (independence) and if, when added to the axiomatic system A1-A5, does not make it contradictory (logical consistency). The following theorem claims the independence and the logical consistency of the axioms A1-A6. Theorem 1. Axioms A1-A6 are independent and form a logically consistent axiomatic system.
Proof. See Appendix
In light of the previously offered justification and Theorem 1, one concludes that A6 must necessarily be part of the axiomatic system to correctly characterize inconsistency indices. Hence, the axiomatic system A1-A6 should be considered instead of A1-A5, which, conversely, is incomplete without A6.
Without loss of generality let us consider a 1n and its reciprocal a n1 and replace them with a δ 1n and a δ n1 , respectively. Then, by calling A δ 1n the new matrix and bearing in mind A ∈ A * , we have
− 2 = (n−2) (a 12 · · · a n−1 n ) δ a 12 · · · a n−1 n + a 12 · · · a n−1 n (a 12 · · · a n−1 n )
If H / ∈ {1, n}, then, in (4) M is constant and A4 holds in this case. Also if H ∈ {1, n} and min j =H {a Hj } = a 1n , then M is constant and A4 is satisfied. Finally, if H = 1 and min j =H {a Hj } = a 1n , it is I ¬6 (A (n − 2) (a 12 · · · a n−1 n ) δ a 12 · · · a n−1 n + a 12 · · · a n−1 n (a 12 · · · a n−1 n )
(a 12 · · · a n−1 n ) δ = (n − 2) a 2δ 1n
Considering that, from A ∈ A * and H = 1, it follows that a 1n ≥ 1 and the partial derivative in δ is
log(a 1n ) − 2a δ 1n log(a 1n ) (n − 2)
, which is always non-negative for δ > 1 and non-positive for 0 < δ < 1. Thus, A4 is satisfied and the axioms A1-A6 are logically independent.
